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Abstract
Secure group management is an important issue in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). The most of previous
works consider the whole network as a single group managed by a central, powerful node (e.g., the base station) ca-
pable of supporting heavy communication, computation and storage cost. However, typical WSNs applications may
beneﬁt from being designed and implemented as a collection of multiple logical groups, each one is maintained by
a sensor node (the group controller) with constrained resources. Furthermore, previous schemes require multicast
support at the routing level to deliver rekeying messages. Unfortunately, multicast may cause a storage and communi-
cation overhead that are not aﬀordable in a WSN. In order to go beyond these two limitations, we propose a new secure
group management scheme with a lightweight re-keying process. The scheme allows multiple logical groups, each
one is maintained and rekeyed separately by a resource-constrained sensor node without requiring multicast routing
support. We prove that the scheme is secure and we evaluate its performance from several view points. Actually, we
show that our scheme outperforms some previous well-known schemes such as LKH.
Keywords: Secure group management, Group communication, Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), Security.
1. Introduction
Wireless sensor networks are generally deployed in a wide area for the purpose of monitoring some environmental
parameters, such as light, humidity, temperature, pressure, etc. In some applications, diﬀerent security levels and
services are often required for each type of information. For this purpose, the network would be divided into several
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groups, each of which is responsible for reporting certain speciﬁc data. Thus, group communication is needed for
each group, especially, when the group controller sends commands/queries to all group members.
In some critical applications such as healthcare, group communication has to be secured. Generally, secure group
communication could be achieved through the use of a group key shared among the group members. The group key
can be managed in either a centralized manner, a distributed manner, or a contributed manner [1, 2]. Because of the
limitations of the distributed and contributed approach, many schemes have opted to the centralized approach. The
trivial solution to deliver the group key, in the centralized approach, is to unicast the key to each group member.
However, in this solution the communication cost is O(n), where n is the number of group members. So, numerous
schemes have been proposed for the sake of reducing the communication, computation and storage cost needed for the
rekeying process. However, the majority of the proposed schemes assume that the group controller is a powerful node
such as a PC or a base station. Actually, they consider the whole network as being a single group managed by the base
station. However, this presents a restrictive deﬁnition of a group and a network model. As a matter of fact, in some
applications several groups managed by resource-constrained sensor nodes might be needed. In addition, proposed
schemes such as [3, 4, 5] suppose that the network has a multicast routing support to deliver the rekeying messages
in a multicast way. However, multicast routing introduces a heavy overhead and communication cost for maintaining
the multicast table and the multicast routes.
As a matter of fact, the previous schemes’ limitations have given us ground to conceive a new secure group
communication scheme. The strengths of this scheme are: it can be applied to a group with a resource-constrained
group controller, it does not require a multicast routing support and it is robust against several known attacks.
Contribution
The idea of secure group communication with resource-constrained group controller was ﬁrst addressed by Cheikh-
rouhou et al. in their paper RiSeG [6]. Yet, the proposed scheme presents an O(n) latency in the rekeying process
and, therefore, cannot support large scale WSNs. Moreover, RiSeG requires synchronization between nodes in order
to avoid replay attacks. However, synchronization is a hard task to be achieved in WSNs [7].
As an improvement, we propose to form a Logical Neighbor Tree (LNT) in order to distribute the key update
messages. Actually, the LNT scheme helps to reduce the key update latency from O(n) to O(log(n)). In addition,
replay attacks robustness is achieved by means of a nonce instead of time-stamp, which is likely to eliminate the
requirement of node synchronization.
In summary, LNT is distinguished by the following features:
• The concept of group is application-based, i.e., groups reﬂect the application needs.
• The group controller could be a sensor node with constrained resources.
• The LNT scheme proposes the membership management in a secure manner and the group key management in
an eﬃcient and secure way.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the LNT scheme and its
design principles. Section 3 describes the LNT membership management. Section 4 presents a comparison between
the LNT rekeying process and other well-known group key management schemes. Finally, we conclude and give
possible future work.
2. LNT Overview and Design Principles
The idea of the LNT scheme consists in distributing the rekeying process task among group members. Indeed, as
the group controller is a sensor node with constrained resources, it cannot support the delivery of rekeying messages
to all group members, nor can support the heavy storage cost introduced by the key encryption keys of the LKH-
based schemes. Therefore, we suggest to construct a logical neighbor tree that helps deliver the rekeying messages
within the group. The logical neighbor tree represents the neighborhood relationship among the group members. The
root of the tree represents the group controller in which neighbor nodes are attached to it. These neighbor nodes are
connected to their neighbor nodes and so on until all group members are covered. The whole tree is maintained by the
group controller, and each group member maintains only a list of its child nodes. On receiving a key update message
from its parent node, the current node forwards this key update message to its child nodes. Therefore, the key update
message sent by the group controller will be forwarded from parent to child nodes until reaching all group members.
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In this way, the group controller should send key update messages only to its neighbors instead of sending it to all the
group members.
The key update message contains the new group key that must be kept exclusively secret among the group mem-
bers. Consequently, this message has to be protected against potential interception attacks. This is achieved by means
of encryption using pairwise keys. In addition, for the sake of preventing a malicious node from injecting false key
update messages, the group controller computes a digital signature which is veriﬁed by the group members. The va-
lidity of the signature proves that the key update message is indeed sent by the group controller and not by a malicious
node. As regards the replay attack robustness, it is achieved by means of a sequence number shared among the group
members.
To sum it up, LNT helps to eliminate the heavy storage cost introduced by the key encryption keys used in the
LKH-based schemes and, simultaneously, provides both authentication and robustness against replay attacks of the
rekeying messages.
3. LNT Membership Management
This section, is allotted to present the diﬀerent membership phases of the LNT scheme, speciﬁcally, the group
creation, the group join and the group leave processes. It is worth noting that these phases must be executed in a
secure manner so as to avoid any possible attack.
After describing each phase, we turn to present the analytical performance study. The chosen performance criteria
are the computation cost, the storage cost, and the communication cost. The diﬀerent notations used throughout this
section are, respectively, explained in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3.
Table 1. Computation cost parameters
Notations Meaning
Cenc The encryption computation cost of the group key.
Cdec The decryption computation cost of the group key.
Csign The computation cost needed to generate a signature.
Cveri f The computation cost needed to verify a signature.
Ckg The computation cost needed to generate a group key.
Ckc The computation cost needed to compute the pairwise key.
Cmac The computation cost needed to compute a message authentication code (MAC).
3.1. Pre-deployment Phase
As in [6], we propose to apply the key pre-distribution scheme proposed by Blundo et al. [8] in order to share a
symmetric key between each pair of nodes. The network administrator chooses a t degree bi-variate polynomial over
a ﬁnite ﬁeld Fq: f (x, y) =
∑i=t
i=0
∑ j=t
j=0 ai, j x
iy j. The value of q is a prime number that is large enough to accommodate
a cryptographic key. Then, the administrator loads in each node Ni the polynomial f (x,Ni). The function f is
symmetric. This means that, when two nodes Ni and N j wish to share a pairwise key, each of them computes
KNi,N j = f (Ni,N j) = f (N j,Ni).
Moreover, to ensure rekeying message authentication, a digital signature scheme was used. The ECDSA [9] was
chosen as it was demonstrated its feasibility in WSNs, and that it is more suitable than other signature schemes (such
as RSA) in the context of WSNs, due to the use of small key size (reduce storage cost) [10]. So that, each node is
preloaded with the domain parameters needed to compute and verify the (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
ECDSA [9]. The domain parameters are the six-tuple T = (p, a, b,G, n, h), where p is a prime number, a and b are
two points from the primary ﬁeld Fp (a, b ∈ Fp) deﬁning the curve, G a base point on the curve with order n and
cofactor h.
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Table 2. Communication cost parameters
Notations Meaning
|m| The size in bits of the message m
mjr join-request message
mlr leave-request message
mjk join-key message
mji join-inform message
mci group-creation-invite message
mcd group creation decision message i.e grp-creation-accept or grp-creation-refuse message
mku key-update message
mnd neighbor discovery message
mcu child update message
mpu parent update message
mpr parent request message
etx The energy consumed for the transmission of 1 bit
erx The energy consumed for the reception of 1 bit
Ttx Time needed for the transmission of 1 bit. (on TelosB Ttx=4 μs (1/250 kbps))
Tkc Time needed for computing a pairwise key.
Tkg Time needed for generating a group key.
Tmac Time needed for computing a MAC
3.2. Group Creation Process
3.2.1. Description
The group creation process is executed when a node requests to join a non-existent group. In this case, and after
having successfully authenticated the node, the Base Station (BS) would invite it to be the Group Controller (GC) of
the requested group. The group creation process is executed according to the following steps:
1. The node sends a join-request message to the BS. This message contains the node identity Ni, the requested
group identity Gid, and a random number used only once nonceNi. This message is protected by a Message
Authentication Code (MAC) ﬁeld computed over the message and using the pairwise key KBS ,Ni shared between
the base station BS and the node Ni.
2. Upon receiving this message, the BS veriﬁes the validity of the node, i.e., that the node does not belong to the
black list of compromised nodes. Then, the BS checks the message authenticity by comparing the received
MAC to the locally computed one using the pairwise key KBS ,Ni shared with this node Ni. If the node’s identity
is valid, the message is authentic, and the requested group does not exist yet, the BS sends a grp-creation-
invite message containing the node nonce nonceNi, and a new generated one nonceBS . This message enables to
authenticate the BS.
3. After authenticating the BS by verifying the MAC ﬁeld, the node has to decide whether to be a group controller
or not. In the former case, it sends a grp-creation-accept message. In the latter case, the node sends a grp-
creation-refuse message. Both message contain the received nonce nonceBS and protected by a MAC. This
permits to avoid any potential replay attack and guarantees the node authentication.
At this step, a new group is being created and the BS stores the group controller address of the new created group Gid.
Moreover, the GC and the BS agree on a speciﬁc sequence number seqNbr. This sequence number is incremented at
each message sent to avoid replay attacks.
3.2.2. Performance evaluation
Computation cost. The computation cost of the LNT scheme during the group creation process is calculated, in this
section, at both the joining node (Ni) and the base station (BS). The joining node, needs to compute the pairwise
key shared with the base station using the Blundo technique (Ckc), and three MACs (3Cmac). The BS computes also
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the pairwise key KBS ,Ni, which requires (Ckc) along with three MACs (3Cmac). Note that, Ni and BS have the same
computation cost (Ckc + 3Cmac), this is due to the fact that each computed MAC must be recomputed at the receiver in
order to be veriﬁed.
Communication cost. The communication cost of the LNT scheme during the group creation process is calculated, in
this section, at the joining node, the base station, and the intermediate node. This calculation is as follows. The joining
node sends a join-request message, receives a group-creation-invite message and sends a group creation decision
message. The total communication cost is |m jr|etx + |mci|erx + |mcd|etx. Moreover, the total communication cost for
the base station is |mjr|erx + |mci|etx + |mcd|erx. An intermediate node (IN) would forward each message exchanged
between the node Ni and the BS, so that the communication cost is equivalent to the size of exchanged messages
multiplied by (etx + erx). Therefore, the communication cost is (|mjr| + |mci| + |mcd|)(etx + erx).
3.3. Group Join Process
3.3.1. Description
Once the group is created, the BS informs the GC about each subsequent join-request message after successfully
authenticating the requesting node. The requesting node authentication is achieved through the BS as it holds a global
overview of the compromised nodes. Consequently, if a node fails to successfully pass the authentication process, its
request will be ignored.
The group join process is executed as follows:
1. The node Ni sends a join-request message to the BS.
2. Upon receiving this message, the BS veriﬁes the node authenticity. If the node is successfully authenticated, the
BS informs the GC of the requested group about the join of the new node Ni. In order to prevent a compromised
node already evicted from the group from replaying an old join-inform message, the message is protected with
a seqNbr.
3. On receiving the join-inform message, the GC veriﬁes its freshness based on the seqNbr. Then, the GC gener-
ates a new group key and transmits it to the node Ni.
4. Upon receiving the join-key message, the node Ni launches a neighbor discovery process. For this purpose,
Ni broadcasts a neighbor-discovery-request message containing the group identity (Gid). Then, each neighbor
node N j belonging to the group Gid responds to Ni by sending a neighbor-discovery-reply message.
5. After that, the newly joined node Ni chooses the appropriate parent from the list of responding neighbors. The
node Ni then informs the GC about its selected parent by sending a parent-update message.
6. When the GC receives a parent-update message from Ni, it ﬁrst checks the validity of the node Pi. In case the
selected parent node is invalid, the GC requests the node Ni to search for another parent. Then, the GC asks the
selected parent node to add Ni to its child list. The GC also updates the local tree.
Note that, if a node has no neighbor member of the requested group, the GC takes the responsibility to send the
key-update message to the newly joined node. So, the GC would add this node to its child in the logical tree.
3.3.2. Tree update due to a join
After the join of a new node, the GC maintains the LNT tree based on the selected parent returned by the joining
node. The joining node sends a neighbor-discovery-request message to discover neighbors which are members of
group Gid. The neighbor-discovery-request contains a parameter hopCount which speciﬁes that the joining node
is looking for neighbors that are at maximum hopCount far from the GC and a parameter hop that speciﬁes how
many times the neighbor-discovery-request will be forwarded. Each member of group Gid receiving this request
responds by sending a neighbor-discovery-replay message. Only nodes that are less than hopCount far from the
GC respond. This guarantee that only nodes on the path from the joining node to the GC could be a parent of the
joining node. If the node is not a member of the requested group, it will decrement the value of hop and forward
the neighbor-discovery-request message if the value of hop still greater than zero. This mechanism of forwarding the
neighbor-discovery-request message permits to search for neighbors farther than one-hop.
The neighbor-discovery-reply message contains parameters that reﬂect the position of the node in the physical
topology and the logical tree namely the physicalhop, the logicalhop, and the childNbr. The physicalhop indicates
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Fig. 1. Physical Network Topology Fig. 2. LNT Tree construction Fig. 3. LNT Tree update
the distance in terms of hops between the GC and the node in the physical topology, the logicalhop represents the
number of hops between the GC and the node in the logical tree, and the childNbr represents the number of nodes
attached to the node. If the joining node does not receive any reply from its immediate neighbors, it will search for
a two-hop neighbor. For this reason, it will increment the value of hop and decrement the value of hopCount. This
process will be repeated until receiving a reply. On receiving a neighbor-discovery-reply message, the joining node
selects a neighbor as a parent. The selection of the parent node is based ﬁrst on the physicalhop, then the logicalhop
and then the childNbr. Therefore, if the joining node receives replies from more than one neighbor with the same
physicalhop then it selects the node with the small logicalhop. If more than one neighbor have the same physicalhop
and logicalhop, the joining node selects the one with the small childNbr. Otherwise, if all the mentioned parametrs are
equal, then the choice can be based on the RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indication) or arbitrary. The physicalhop
parameter promotes a tree with minimum transmission cost. The logicalhop and childNbr parameters promote a
balanced tree which speeds up the rekeying process. The joining node sends then a parent-update message to the GC.
The latter informs the parent to add the joining node to its child list. The GC also updates the logical tree. The joining
node broadcasts a neighbor reply message informing nodes that there is a new path to the GC with the indicated cost.
Neighbor nodes that hear this message can then update their parents by sending a parent-update message to the GC.
Let us assume, for example, that node 23 wants to join a group as in Fig.1. After its join, the node 23 discovers
its neighbors. For this reason, it broadcasts a neighbor-discovery-request message that contains the group identity
Gid, with hopCount=3 and hop initially equal to 1. Each node belonging to the group Gid and hearing the neighbor-
discovery-request message replies with a neighbor-discovery-reply message. This message contains the node identity,
the physicalhop (number of hops in which the node is away from the GC in the physical topology), the logicalhop
(number of hops in which the node is away from the GC in the logical tree) and the childNbr (the number of nodes
attached to this node). In our case, node 23 has three neighbors {19, 11, 20}, which would respond respectively with
(19,3,3,0), (11,2,2,1), and (20,2,2,2). First node 23 selects node 11 and node 20 as they present the small physicalhop
value. Then node 23 views the logicalhop value. As node 11 and node 20 have the same logicalhop value, the joining
node (node 11) views the third parameter with is the childNbr value. As node 11 has the small childNbr (1), it would
be selected by node 23 as the parent node. Node 23 then informs the group controller by sending a parent-update
message containing the address of node 11. Upon receiving this message, the GC informs node 11 to add node 23 to
its child list.
3.3.3. Performance evaluation
The group join process involves four categories of node: The joining node (Ni), the base station (BS), the group
controller (GC), and the Ni’s parent node (Pi). The GC is responsible for maintaining the group members, the group
key and the LNT structure.
Computation cost. The computation cost of the LNT scheme during the group join process is calculated, in this
section, for the four categories of node mentioned above; Ni, BS, GC, and Pi. This calculation is as follows. The
joining node needs to compute two pairwise keys: the one shared with the base station and the one shared with the
GC (2Ckc). It also needs to calculate two MACs (2Cmac), and a decryption (Cdec). Thus, the total computation cost is
(2Ckc + 2Cmac + Cdec). The base station computation cost is 2Ckc + 2Cmac. The GC interacts ﬁrst with BS to receive
the join-inform message, and then with the joining node to sends the encrypted group key, and then with the parent of
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Table 3. LNT parameters
Notations Meaning
d Average number of the tree degree (corresponds to the average number of child node)
h The tree height
n Number of group members (n = dh for a balanced tree)
hop Average number of hops between group members
b Average number of neighbor nodes belonging to the same group of a node.
Pi The selected parent of the joining node.
the joining node to maintain the tree, and ﬁnally with its children to send them the key-update message. The GC total
computation cost is 3Ckc + 3Cmac +Ckg +Cenc. As regards the Ni’s parent node, the computation cost is Ckc +Cmac.
Communication cost.
The communication cost of the LNT scheme group join process is calculated, in this section, for Ni, BS, GC, and
Pi. This calculation is as follows. The Ni computation cost is |mjr|etx+ |mjk|erx+ |mnd|etx+b |mnd| erx+ |mpu| etx. The
BS computation cost is |m jr|erx+ |m ji|etx. The GC receives a join-inform message from the BS, sends a join-key to Ni,
receives a parent-update message from the Ni, sends a child-update to Pi and then sends a key-update to its children.
The total communication cost is |m ji|erx + |m jk|etx + |mpu|erx + |mcu|etx. For the parent Pi, the communication cost is
|mnd|erx + |mnd|etx + |mcu|erx.
3.4. Group Leave Process
3.4.1. Description
A node can decide to leave the group, for instance, when its mission is over. In this case, the node explicitly leaves
the group by sending a leave-request message. A node can also be forced to leave, for instance, if it is classiﬁed as
compromised. In both cases, the GC must maintain the LNT tree and update the group key to achieve forward secrecy.
An explicit leaving is executed as follows:
1. The leaving node sends to the GC a leave-request message containing its identity, the group identity and pro-
tected by a sequence number and a MAC.
2. On receiving this message, the GC veriﬁes the authenticity of the message. Then, the GC sends a child-update
message to Ni’s parent in order to remove Ni from its child list. The child-update message is also protected by
a MAC. This MAC prevents attackers from launching a DoS attack by sending fake child-update messages that
cause the remove of group members.
3. In order to maintain the logical neighbor tree, for each Ni’s child node, the GC sends a parent-request message
that invites the node to search for another parent.
4. The tree maintenance continues idem to the tree maintenance in the group join process: After selecting a new
parent, each child node Ck sends a parent-update message to the GC. The latter asks the selected parent to
update its child node list. The GC also updates the local tree.
5. Finally, the GC launches the key-update process to renew the group key. The evicted node will not receive this
new key as it is not part of the group anytime.
Notes:
• The logical neighbor tree must be saved at the GC as it needs to know the LNT structure in the case of a node
compromise. In fact, suppose that the GC would like to revoke the node Ni, the GC must, in this case, eliminate
the node Ni from the LNT. For this purpose, the GC would tell Ni’s parent to remove Ni from its child list and
tell Ni’s child to ﬁnd another parent. After that, the GC would update the group key, which would not reach the
compromised node Ni as it is ejected from the tree.
• We assume that each sent message is acknowledged. So, after a number of attempts, if the sender does not
succeed to receive an acknowledgment message, it will suppose that the link is no more available. Therefore,
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if a node fails or leaves the group without a notice, child nodes will detect that the communication with their
parent is no longer available and so, will re-ﬁnd another parent. Therefore, the leaving without a notice is
similar to an explicit leaving.
• If the GC fails, one solution is that: the ﬁrst child nodes that detect the GC failure will send a message to the
BS informing it about GC failure. Then, the BS will invite this node to be the new GC. After that, the BS sends
a broadcast message to inform group members about the address of the new GC. Then, every group member
will send to this new GC a parent update message informing it about the address of its parent. Thanks to these
parent update messages, the new GC can construct the LNT tree.
3.4.2. Tree update due to a leave
The LNT tree has two types of nodes : leaf nodes, which are nodes without any attached child node, and parent nodes,
which are nodes with one or more children. Leaf nodes are those located at the bottom of the tree, while the parent
nodes are intermediate nodes between a GC and leaf nodes.
Let’s assume that node 15 in Fig.1 wants to leave the group. In this case, the GC sends a child-update message to
node 6, which is node 15’s parent, to remove node 15 from its child node list. The leaving of a parent node is more
complicated than the leaving of a leaf node as, for a parent node, its child nodes (descendant nodes) must be attached
to another parent. Instead of node 15, let us assume that node 6 wants to leave the group. The update of the LNT
tree can be launched in two manners. Either, node 6 informs child nodes {12, 13} about its leave, or node 6 informs
the GC about its leave, and the latter requests the child nodes to re-send an updated address of their parents. In both
cases, each child node should re-ﬁnd another parent using the neighbor discovery process and then inform the GC.
Therefore, after the leaving of node 6, associated child nodes {12, 13} renew their parents as follows. Node 12 with
neighbor members {16, 17} selects node 16 as parent, and node 13 with neighbors {14} selects node 14 as a parent.
The new LNT resulting from the join of node 23 and the leaving of node 15 and node 6 is presented in Fig.3.
Note that, if node 6 leaves silently (e.g due to energy exhaustion), child nodes will detect that the link to parent (node
6) is no more available, and so, they search for a new parent.
3.4.3. Performance evaluation
The group leave process involves the following categories of node: the leaving node (Ni): is the node that sends a
leave-request message to the GC, the group controller (GC), the intermediate node (IN), the Ni’s parent node (Pi), the
Ni’s child nodes (Ci).
Computation cost. The computation cost of the LNT scheme during the group leave process is calculated, in this
section, for three types of nodes: Ni, GC, and Pi. This calculation is as follows. The Ni computation cost is Ckc+Cmac
and the GC computation cost 2Ckc + 2Cmac.
Communication cost. The communication cost of the LNT scheme group leave process is calculated, in this section,
for three types of nodes: Ni, GC, and Pi. This calculation is as follows. Ni: |mlr|etx (or 0 in case of a silently leaving),
GC: |mlr|erx+ |mcu|etx+d |mpu| erx, Pi: |mcu|erx+ |mlr|erx+ |mlr|etx and Ci: |mpr|erx+ |mnd|etx+b |mnd| erx+ |mpu|etx.
4. Rekeying Process Performance Evaluation and Comparison
This section is allotted to compare our proposed LNT rekeying scheme with the well-known proposed group key
management schemes for secure group communication. The analytical performances of our proposed LNT scheme
are as follows:
4.1. Computation cost
The group controller needs to generate a new group key (Ckg) and send it encrypted to its d child nodes (d(Ckc +
Cenc)). The GC also attaches a signature (Csign) to the rekeying message. Therefore, the GC computation cost is
Ckg + d(Ckc +Cenc) +Csign. An end device needs to verify the signature (Cveri f ), decrypt the message (Cdec), and then
forward it to its child nodes (d(Ckc+Cenc)). Hence, the end device computation cost isCkc+Cveri f +Cdec+d(Ckc+Cenc).
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4.2. Communication cost
Every node sends d messages and receives 1 message (communication cost is O(1)). More speciﬁcally, single node
communication cost is: |mku|erx + |mku|detx = |mku|(erx + detx).
4.3. Storage cost
The group controller has to store the neighbor tree (n ∗ sizeo f (ID)), the Blundo polynomial share= (t + 1) ∗
log(q), where t is the degree of the polynomial (t reﬂects the scheme security: the scheme is t-collusion) and q is
the large prime number, so large to accommodate a cryptographic key (q reﬂects the key size). The GC stores also a
private/public key. Concerning the end device, it has to store the neighbors’ addresses (d ∗ sizeo f (ID)), the Blundo
polynomial share ( (t + 1) ∗ log(q)), and the public key of the group controller.
4.4. Latency
The latency is the time taken by the key-update message in order to reach all nodes in the group. The latency
is composed of the transmission time and the propagation time. As the propagation time can be neglected, in what
follows, we consider only the transmission time. However, in the case of multi-hop transmission, the transmission time
introduced by intermediate nodes should also be added. For the LNT scheme, the latency depends on the construction
of the logical tree. LNT has a good latency (d ∗ h ∗ Ttx) with a uniform tree, and the worst case is when each member
has only 1 neighbor (n ∗ Ttx).
Note, real time is higher than these values as computation time, retransmission delay, etc has to be added. So, the
execution time has been deﬁned as being the time needed to renew a group key. The execution time includes the time
for generating the key, the time for encryption the key and the time for transmitting and deciphering the key.
key update execution time= Tkg + Tsign + d.(Tkc + Tenc)+ d.|mku|.Ttx + (h− 1).(Tkc + Tdec + Tveri f + d.(Tkc + Tenc)+
d.|mku|.Ttx)=Tkg + Tsign + (h − 1).(Tkc + Tdec + Tveri f ) + h.d.(Tkc + Tenc + |mku|.Ttx)
4.5. Comparison
In order to put in evidence the performance of the LNT scheme, we have compared it with the main schemes
cited in the literature as LKH [3], TKH [5] and RiSeG [6]. Moreover, based on the analytical model, we have plotted
curves showing the performance of these schemes when varying the number of group members n. Due to lack of
space, analytical model of RiSeG, LKH, and TKH schemes can be extracted directly from their respective papers.
For the storage cost, the size of keys is set to 128 bits. This key size is used for AES cryptographic algorithm. The
identity of node is set to 16 bits. As shown in Fig.4, the LNT scheme represents the best storage cost. In fact, with
n=1024, LKH requires about 23.3 Kbytes , TKH requires 21.2 Kbytes, RiSeG and LNT require 2.1 Kbytes of ROM
memory. For TelosB motes, which have 48 Kbytes of ROM, LKH and TKH consume about 50% of the available
ROM, however, LNT consume only 5% of ROM.
For the communication cost, the unit communication costs are set to etx =0.209 μJ and erx =0.226 μJ from the
characteristics of the CC2420 transceiver used in the Xbow’s MICA-Z and TelosB sensor nodes [11]. Fig.5 shows
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that the communication cost at the GC in the LNT scheme is independent of the number of group members and is
smaller than that of the LKH and TKH schemes.
Fig.6 shows that without multicast support LKH has the biggest duration of the key update process. RiSeG has
also a big duration (3072 ms when n=1024). For LNT, we have drawn 3 curves: the best case LNT(min) is when we
have a balanced tree, LNT(max) is the worst case, when d = 1 (each member has only 1 member), and LNT(avg)
represents the average of LNT(min) and LNT(max). For n=1024, LNT(max)=1024 ms, LNT(min)=20 ms, and so
LNT(avg)=522 ms. With multicast support, LKH needs 60 ms and TKH 153 ms to update the key of a group of 1024
nodes.
Note that LNT outperforms other group communication schemes in terms of storage cost, computation and com-
munication cost at the GC and it does not require a multicast routing support.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed LNT: a Logical Neighbor Tree for secure group management that can be applied
to a homogeneous WSN network with a resource-constrained group controller. The scheme alleviates the group con-
troller’s task by constructing a logical neighbor tree that helps deliver the rekeying messages. Performance analysis
has shown that our scheme outperforms some previously well-known schemes in terms of computation, communica-
tion and storage costs. LNT scheme can be improved by replacing the ECC-based digital signature scheme by a more
lightweight method of authentication such as the use of a key-chain [12].
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